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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUAL TRUST IN BRITISH 
WORKPLACES THROUGH ‘PARTNERSHIP’: 
CONCEPTUALISATIONS, DEFINITIONS AND EXPERIENCES. 
 
 “The defining characteristic of successful partnerships is trust”  (Cave & Coats [TUC], 1998). 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
This article examines the alleged links between ‘partnership’ forms of managing workplace 
relationships in Britain, and the development of intra-organisational ‘trust’. The potential for 
mutually complementary linkages between the two are clear, in theory at least: partnership, as 
defined here, should produce, nurture and enhance levels of interpersonal trust inside 
organisations, while in turn trust, as defined here, legitimates and helps reinforce an 
organisation’s ‘partnership’. Qualitative evidence drawn from the self-reports of key 
participants in four partnership organisations provides considerable support for the claimed 
linkages, while also highlighting several weaknesses, discrepancies and pitfalls inherent in the 
process of pursuing trust through partnership.  
 
This research is of interest from a public policy perspective, most of all in the United 
Kingdom, where partnership is the favoured organisational model for the New Labour 
government, most trade unions, and many employers (not to mention the European Union) yet 
where an agreed definition of the idea has yet to emerge, and where still remarkably little is 
known about what partnership involves inside organisations.  
 
This analysis also seeks to restore the curiously neglected idea of trust to a position of central 
importance to the study of employment relations.  
 
   
1. Introduction. 
The 1990s witnessed a revival in interest among management practitioners and academics in 
the notion of developing trust, both between and within organisations (see Lane & Bachman, 
1998; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; the Academy of Management Review, volume 23, number 3, 
1998). One strand of this interest viewed trust as a plausible target objective for management 
programmes seeking improved organisational performance from a more positive and mutually 
beneficial ‘psychological contract’ between management teams and employee groups 
(Rousseau, 1989; Shore & Tetrick, 1994; Robinson, 1996; Herriot, Manning & Kidd, 1997; 
Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2002). Another strand, however, reflected widespread concerns at 
evidence of declining workplace trust levels following the ‘downsizing’ and work 
intensification programmes that characterised the middle period of the decade (Kessler & 
Undy, 1996; Baillie, 1995). Herriot, Hirsh & Riley (1998) reported a disastrous rupture of 
long-standing bonds of reciprocity, and recommended a programme to restore trust. These 
latter concerns, and the recommendations to re-build trust, echoed debate at a broader societal 
level (Misztal, 1995; Fukuyama, 1995; Warren, 1999) that continues still (O’Neill, 2002).  
 
Linking the two, Sparrow and Marchington (1998) have posited the challenge facing HRM as 
one of unravelling its contribution to the process of organisational performance. Many 
‘strategic’ HRM models rather assume that a happy alignment of shared interests between 
management teams and workforce will follow naturally from the effective implementation of 
its recommended policies and practices. This is, of course, far from assured. Becker, Hueslid 
and Ulrich (2000: p2) among many others have identified “the ability to execute strategy” as 
the differentiating factor between successful and failed HR strategies. Trust may yet prove a, 
if not the, decisive mediating factor. Sparrow and Marchington urged HRM scholars and 
practitioners to “demonstrate the cost of trust deficits” and how pursuing stronger 
organisational trust “outweighs the profit potential that comes from violating expectations” 
(op cit: p311).  
 
Concurrent with this emerging interest in trust, the UK has undergone another of its periodic 
bouts of enthusiasm for ‘collaborative workplace’-style reforms. The latest version bears the 
label ‘partnership’. Since the return of the New Labour government in May 1997, 
‘partnership’ has become, superficially at least, the foremost industrial relations policy 
paradigm in the UK. It is official policy - albeit in rather differing forms - for the government 
(DTI, 1999; 1999b; Knell, 1999), the Trades Union Congress (TUC, 1997; 1999) and most 
   
trade unions. It is the policy recommendation of choice for think tanks such as the Industrial 
Society (2001) and ACAS (1999). It has even been welcomed, albeit with a large number of 
caveats, by the CBI, and several leading British employers. Finally, it is the favoured policy 
direction of the European Union (European Commission, 1997); indeed, the UK model has 
borrowed much of its vision, vocabulary, and evidence of validity from Europe (Terry, 2001).  
 
In the ‘partnership’ literature ‘trust’ is a constant and defining presence. Advocates present 
their favoured prescriptions – in essence the pursuit of benefits for all parties through joint 
problem solving - as a ‘high-trust’ model for improving workplace relationships (witness the 
Cave & Coats quote above; also IPA, 1997), and organisational performance (Guest & Peccei, 
1998; 2001). This conceptual linkage has been supported for several years now by anecdotal 
evidence from participants in partnership organisations, in case studies published by the IPA, 
the TUC, the DTI, ACAS, IDS (1998), IRS (2000) and at ‘partnership’ conferences. Over 100 
case studies are summarised on the DTI’s dedicated website (http://www.partnership-at-
work.com).  
 
Guest and Peccei pointed to a fruitful research agenda “on the role of trust in effective 
partnership at work… to identify the processes that must be in place for high trust to emerge” 
(2001: p232). Yet still we know little of how this happens. 
 
This article offers an exploratory analysis of both concepts, and presents case study evidence 
of the experience of partnership and trust in four genuine UK-based partnership organisations.  
 
Given the enormous significance of trust to partnership – it has been cited as a necessary pre-
condition; the process through which partnership is realised; one of its most important 
outcomes, and the main method for monitoring progress and constraining ‘anti-partnership’ 
actions – the opening section sets out a nuanced definition of this elusive element. The second 
section then proposes a definition of partnership based on the identified requirements for trust. 
The third section sets out the potential complementary linkages between the two. The fourth 
section then summarises the narrative experiences in each of the four partnership 
organisations, and brief details of their partnership practices, followed by general findings and 
learning points from each. The conclusion offers some thoughts on what partnership can (and 
cannot) do to develop trust, and suggests an abundance of testable hypotheses for future 
research. 
   
 
2. Definitions of trust.  
Trust is best understood as a belief. In the most concise definitions it is depicted as “a 
psychological state comprising the intention to be vulnerable [to another] based on positive 
expectations” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998: p395); as “confident positive 
expectations about another’s conduct” in a context of personal risk (Lewicki, McAllister & 
Bies, 1998: p439), and as reflecting “an expectation or belief that the other party will act 
benevolently” (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard & Werner, 1998: p513; see also Gambetta, 1988: 
p217; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). These definitions share a number of conceptual 
points which can be divided into two strands (below): three set out the relationship’s 
structures and parameters, while five define the content of the trust belief.   
 
The first straightforward point is trust’s mutuality or reciprocal principle (Fox, 1974: p67); it 
requires at least two parties.1 Secondly, trust must exist in a context of risk; it “cannot exist 
without the possibility of being in error” (Bhattacharya, Devinney & Pillutla, 1998: p462). 
Trust is of trivial value if one enjoys certain knowledge about the other’s intentions and 
actions. Relatedly, all parties should be vulnerable to actions from the other; all parties should 
be in a position to damage the other’s interests, and to have recourse to mechanisms for 
enforcing trust, and for coping with any fall-out, including the freedom to withdraw from the 
relationship if necessary. This “mutual dependence” and shared vulnerability distinguishes 
trust from other forms of securing co-operation, such as coercion. Thirdly, trust is necessarily 
incremental; it can only emerge in any credible form “through repeated exchanges of benefits 
between parties” (Whitener et al, op cit: p515; see also Axelrod, 1984, 1997 on game theory 
in this regard).  
 
Turning to the content of the belief, the reason for this last characteristic relates to trust’s 
inherent risk. It is not informed by certainty, nor is it a condition of ignorance; it is instead an 
“expectation”, a “probability” (Gambetta, 1988). This demands an evaluation of the other 
party’s likely future behaviour that can only be based on a sufficient body of credible evidence 
(from a series of interactions, ideally in a range of settings).  
 
                                                          
1 One may speak of trusting oneself (or not), but this is illogical, for unless one is mentally impaired to a 
significant degree, one is in control of, and responsible for, one’s own decisions. 
   
Secondly, this evaluation needs to assess the trustworthiness not only of the other’s motives 
(what some have divided into “benevolence” and “integrity”), but also their competence (i.e.: 
their capacity to fulfil their trust-based promises or realise their stated goals).  
 
Thirdly, and crucially, trust’s reliance on expectation carries with it a “strength of feeling” 
(Bhattacharya et al, op cit: p462), a significant confidence, that elevates it above what would 
otherwise be mere hopefulness, blind faith or gullibility, for to make oneself vulnerable to 
another without assessing the evidence in favour of such a decision is surely one of these 
three, and should not be conflated with trust. This point may seem like pedantic semantics, 
but it is important in order to protect trust from two criticisms: that it is “unreflective” 
(Garfinkel’s claim, cited in Lane, 1998: p11) or, as Marxists might sneer, that it is ‘false 
consciousness’. Its drawing reasonable conclusions from evidence refutes both allegations. 
Zand’s definition - as the “conscious regulation of one’s dependence on another” (1972: my 
emphasis) - reflects this, as does Sheppard and Sherman’s concise definition where  trust is “a 
manageable act of faith” (1998: p422).  
 
The fourth point, that trust is a desired state, also addresses these criticisms. With trust each 
party the relationship must be “important” to each party, and the likely outcomes “positive” or 
“benevolent”.2 These outcomes need not be, as Hosmer argues, “ethically justifiable” and 
“morally correct” (1995: p399), just in one’s interests. Judgements on the ethical or moral 
dimensions of decisions taken in employment relations are problematic, and unnecessary.  
 
Finally, the evaluation of the evidence can be “compartmentalised and aggregated” (Lewicki, 
McAllister & Bies, op cit) such that parties, if they wish, may accommodate contradictions 
and errors, if they still judge the quality of trust overall to be worthwhile pursuing. (See the 
degrees of trust below.) Trust allows flexibility in response.  
 
So, to summarise, trust exists between two or more parties that have entered an ongoing 
relationship willingly and positively in a context of risk for all parties. Trust itself is a 
subjective, aggregated, evolving and confident belief, based on a body of evidence, that the 
                                                          
2 The remark “you can trust him completely, he’ll always let you down” is a common misapplication of the 
word, and is recognised as paradoxical precisely because it plays on several of the elements of what does 
constitute trust. 
   
other’s likely actions will have positive consequences for oneself, leading to a willingness to 
render oneself vulnerable to the other party. 
 
Neither crude either/ or conceptualisations (trust or distrust), nor even categories of 
“conditional trust” and “unconditional trust” (cf. Jones & George, 1998: p536), or “strong” 
and “weak” forms (cf. Barney & Hansen, 1994), capture trust’s intriguing subtleties of degree. 
In the literature there are five such degrees of interpersonal trust, plus institutional-based trust 
(such as trust in doctors as a professional group), which is not relevant in a UK context 
(discussed in the next section). The five degrees can be placed along a continuum of intensity 
and progress (Figure 1):  
 
Figure 1: The five degrees of trust on a ‘continuum’ of integrity and progress. 
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as a positive belief, begins here. As behavioural expectations become self-reinforcing and are 
evidently in each party’s own interests, more powerful forms develop.  
 
The confidence in relational-based trust (Rousseau et al, op cit: p399) is more subjective, and 
even emotional in nature. Drawn more from the other party’s overall record of reciprocal 
benevolent conduct in the relationship than from more systematic assessments of their likely 
intentions, it is the difference between “dependability” and “faith” (McAllister, 1995: p26). It 
can even tolerate minor ‘defections’ as somehow an uncharacteristic aberration from the 
powerful principles that have arisen to govern what is acceptable in the relationship.  
 
Finally, the depth of all-powerful affection described in identification-based trust (Shapiro, 
Sheppard and Cheraskin, 1992) is such that each party may assume the identity of the other – 
their aspirations, objectives, decision-making and self-presentation - with the other’s full 
confidence. Their identities merge. Trust is total and unquestioned. While it is contestable 
whether this is possible in employment situations (and if it is, whether it is desirable), at the 
risk of trailing in advance outcomes from the fieldwork, the case studies provide some 
striking findings in this regard.  
 
2b. How is trust established?  
This section considers the antecedents of, and influences on, mutual trust at the level of 
interpersonal workplace relations. While Bachman rightly points to a “loose coupling” (1998) 
between interpersonal relations and the parameters set by institutional structures such as 
legislation, and other sectoral or national constraints, no such arrangements currently exert 
any significant influence in Britain (as they do in much of continental Europe). In any case, 
the attitudes and behaviours exhibited by parties to a relationship develop the quality, or 
otherwise, of trust, not institutional constraints. That said, comparative international research 
would be interesting to test for the influence of institutional arrangements, or national cultural 
norms in the development of trust (see Zak & Knack, 2001 for their excellent experiment). 
 
Whitener and colleagues (1998: p516-518) cite five “categories of behaviour” required for 
“managerial trustworthiness”. Given trust’s reciprocal principle, these can, and should, apply 
to all other constituencies at work (hence, where appropriate, my amendments to their text): 
1. Behavioural consistency. By this is meant reliability and, to some extent, predictability of 
actions. 
   
2. Behavioural integrity. This involves telling the truth and keeping promises: “the 
consistency between what [someone] says and what he or she does”. 
3. Sharing and delegation of control. By this is meant shared input into decision-making at a 
variety of organisational levels.  
4. Communication. Information needs to be shared openly, it needs to be accurate and 
timely, and it also should be explained in its proper context.  
5. Demonstration of concern. This means “showing consideration and sensitivity for [each 
party’s] needs and interests; acting in a way that protects [each party’s] interests, and 
refraining from exploiting others for the benefit of one’s own interests”.  
 
In any HRM model purporting to promote and develop trust we would expect to be able to 
observe these behaviours, and policies and practices designed to encourage them. Can 
partnership fulfil these requirements?  
 
3. Toward an honest definition of partnership. 
As with ‘trust’, confusion persists over how best to define ‘partnership’ (see Ackers & Payne, 
1998; Guest & Peccei, 2001; Tailby & Winchester, 2000). The prolonged absence of an 
agreed and meaningful definition - one that is coherent and realistic, but more importantly 
observable and testable – is further exacerbated by a dearth of genuine and extensive case 
studies (exceptions being Marks et al, 1998; Haynes & Allen, 2001), and plenty of spurious 
ones. Both deficiencies have stifled progress in understanding partnership in the UK.  
 
Partnership’s “inherent ambiguity” (Bacon & Storey, 2000: p409) is compounded by its 
application on several different levels. It is used to refer to the so-called ‘European’ model of 
‘social partnership’, involving institutionalised dialogue on social and economic policy 
between different ‘stakeholder’ constituencies. This operates at national, sectoral and 
organisational levels in many European countries, the German co-determination system and 
the Dutch ‘polder’ model being two examples. In the UK, the New Labour government has 
initiated similar initiatives, notably over the national minimum wage (see Metcalf, 1999; 
Brown, 2000) and the Chancellor’s ‘productivity initiative’, but these have been one-offs 
rather than part of a systematic programme of multi-constituency congresses. The government 
has also used the term ‘partnership’, contentiously, to describe contractual relationships 
between private companies and public sector workforces to deliver public services. 
 
   
However, it is most commonly used to refer to workplace or organisational employment 
relations scenarios (Tailby & Winchester, 2000: p374). Within organisations, the term can 
correctly describe a collaborative endeavour between managers and employees, such as over 
skills training and health and safety (Munro & Rainbird, 2000). But to be considered a 
‘partnership organisation’ surely involves significantly more than demonstrating temporary, 
calculative co-operation over one or a handful of workplace matters. Indeed, it is important to 
rescue the potency of the idea of a partnership organisation (suggesting - as it surely does – a 
positive, enduring and committed pact for mutual gain between more or less equal 
participants) from its almost ‘Orwellian’3 associations with patently unequal and even 
exploitative work situations or, more commonly, with only modest joint consultative efforts 
or cynically-manufactured union recognition deals (cf. Wray, 2001).  
 
3b. Partnership defined: a set of principles and practices. 
Fortunately Undy (1999) has identified a gradual convergence of credible definitions around 
six essential components. These form the core of the two most influential and most commonly 
cited definitions, those of the Involvement and Participation Association (IPA), and the TUC: 
1. A joint declaration of commitment to the success of the organisation 
2. Mutual recognition of the legitimate role and interests of each organisational 
constituency: management, trade unions (where present), and employees 
3. Sharing information and consulting in joint problem solving, involving representative 
arrangements for an ‘independent employee voice’ 
4. A determined attempt to balance flexible work practices with employment security 
5. Sharing organisational success among all employees, and  
6. Commitment and effort to develop and sustain trust between the organisation’s 
constituencies. 
 
3c. The IPA definition of partnership. 
For the reasons I set out below, I consider that the partnership model articulated by the IPA 
remains the most coherent and viable model of trust-enhancing partnership on offer.4 Itself a 
‘partnership’ product of joint union-management consultation, the IPA model (1992) was the 
                                                          
3 To equate ‘partnership’ with such distortions are, to me, reminiscent of the Big Brother maxims “War Is 
Peace” and “Freedom Is Slavery”. 
4 I should declare an interest here. During the course of this research I worked part-time in a self-employed 
capacity for the IPA as their Research Manager. However, I would refute any allegation of an undue conflict of 
interest or influence on my research. The conclusions here stand on their own merit. 
   
first attempt to define partnership in its present incarnation, and set the template for all who 
followed (Bacon & Storey, 1996: p41; IRS, 2000: p7).  
 
Unlike many other conceptualisations (see ACAS, 1999), the IPA model goes beyond ill-
defined aspirations to set out a ‘bundle’ of HR practices that, together, form a coherent HRM 
model for managing workplace relationships. The prescriptions are practically-minded: 
malleable enough to allow for several interpretations and adaptations, but sufficiently specific 
for associated practices and policies to be readily observable. Robert Taylor called it “the best 
example of the new consensual approach” for workplace relations (1994: p200), while Guest 
and Peccei judge it to be one of the “most systematic” definitions (2001: p211), along with the 
near-identical principles adopted by the TUC (1999).   
 
The IPA model is set out in Figure 2 (note that this is the author’s own diagrammatic 
representation): 
 
Figure 2: IPA Partnership model (author’s own diagrammatic representation). 
 
  PRINCIPLES    PRACTICES   OUTCOMES 
(‘Commitments’)                  (‘Building blocks’)   
 
     producing policies and practices 
    addressing ‘security-for-flexibility’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  producing policies and practices 
             for sharing the organisation’s success  
Commitment to 
the success of the 
enterprise 
Consultation with, 
and representation 
of, the workforce 
 (i.e.: joint problem 
solving) at all levels, 
plus extensive two-
way information 
sharing. 
PCommitment to 
the legitimate 
role/ interests of 
each party  
 
It is to be preferred over the TUC’s definition for two important reason
model allows for non-unionised forms of partnership. Despite union
protestations, these can and do exist, although they are very rare ind
partnership’s appeal beyond its present union-only ‘ghetto’, and re
government’s own conceptualisation. More than this however, as will be PARTNERSHI  
Commitment to 
building trust and 
extending 
employee 
involvements. Fi
s’ u
eed. 
flec
showTRUSTrstly, the IPA 
nderstandable 
This extends 
ts better the 
n in the next 
   
section, the IPA model dovetails with the requirements for establishing trust (partnership’s 
key process and outcome) better than any other model. The TUC principles for example 
contain no mention of ‘trust’ (although it has since been identified as a “defining 
characteristic” – cf. the Cave & Coats quote), but more curiously, the TUC also avoids any 
provisions for workforce consultation (though it is of course implicit) and for employees 
“sharing the success” of the organisation. They focus instead on “enhancing the quality of 
working life” which, tellingly, does not involve pay. (Perhaps the TUC avoided pay issues so 
as not to scare off future employer ‘partners’, or their own affiliates?)  These are serious gaps.  
 
In the IPA model the three ‘commitments’ are envisaged as firmly-held and passionately-
defended organisational principles: not confined to warm words in the mission statement, but 
firmly rooted in the “organisational beliefs” (cf. Schein, 1986), or “overarching ideology” (cf. 
Mintzberg, 1995), about the nature of the employment relationship, and how it is best 
managed. They provide coherence to the HR strategy and to the design of policy and practice, 
and their presence is considered essential if a company is to be labelled a ‘partnership’ 
organisation (Guest & Peccei, 1998: p19). 
 
The four ‘building blocks’ are observable, functioning policies and practices. The principal 
means of managing partnership (as depicted in the central box) is a continuous process of 
joint problem solving throughout the organisation, from the nearest to different 
constituencies’ workplace up to the strategic level. The precise structure and content is left 
unproscribed, but might be expected to involve a mix of direct and indirect forms of employee 
participation in decision-making (works councils/ staff forums, employee board 
representatives, staff briefings, team structures, etc) – as appropriate to, and effective for, the 
organisation. The conduct of the joint problem solving needs to facilitate proactive and shared 
participation, and to be sincere and consistent. Employee groups do not control the decision-
making, but do influence significantly (by their own standards) its outcomes. This in turn 
demands open and timely exchange of honest and accurate information “laterally, upwards 
and downwards” (IPA, 1997: p11) at what has been called the ‘glint-in-the-eye’ stage of 
planning, and throughout. This is expected to include sensitive commercial information 
(opening the ‘books’ – see Case, 1997). Skills training may be needed to help employees 
make an effective contribution. 
 
   
While unions argue, with some justification, that they can best provide the independence, 
strength and wealth of experience that permits proper workforce consultation (USDAW, 
1998), the IPA points to the effective, employee-led representation arrangements in non-
unionised enterprises such as the John Lewis Partnership, St Lukes' Communications (see 
Law, 1999) and Sportasia (IPA, 2002) as counter-evidence to the unions’ claim for exclusive 
dominion over partnership.  
 
Of the policies produced by this process of joint problem solving, “recognition of the 
employee’s need for employment security and the company’s need to maximise flexibility” is 
perhaps the most important. ‘Flexibility’ is, again, left up to the partners to define, but 
‘employment security’ is more precisely explained. To equate this with a ‘job-for-life’ 
promise is a lazy and often wilfully cynical misunderstanding. The IPA describes the 
arrangement as providing “a stable employment framework” (1997: p2). This means, ideally, 
a multi-year pay deal and/ or a no-compulsory redundancy package, complemented with a fair 
and just redundancy selection policy and the careful joint management of employees’ 
expectations and needs both prior to, during and after the process of any unavoidable job 
losses.  
 
The other key policy is means for sharing organisational success, by which is envisaged not 
just financial rewards (employee share ownership, profit-sharing or ‘gainsharing’ bonuses) 
but – with one eye on the public sector - other measures of organisation-wide commendation 
(such as celebrating improved performance). Single-status and/ or harmonised terms and 
conditions are considered important for the “symbolism” that all of the firm’s employees are 
valued equally (beyond salary differentials of course).  
 
To be considered a genuine example of partnership an organisation should be able to 
demonstrate tangible evidence of all of these principles, policies and practices. To have only 
the principles without the practices is to have merely produced a mission statement; to have 
only the practices, but no overarching principles, is to leave the practices floundering for want 
of direction, and vulnerable to abandonment.  Equally, to have no all-level joint problem 
solving fails to differentiate partnership from passive compliance to managerial diktat, a 
minimal “sham” employee involvement effort, or paternalism and, finally, to have only joint 
problem solving, but no exchange of tangible mutual benefits (such as employment security 
for flexibility, and sharing success), or a commitment to improve relationships, fails to 
   
distinguish partnership from any other collective negotiations. Partnership is, in short, a model 
that ought to be implemented in full.  
 
None of this is especially new, of course. Some elements have been tried before in the UK 
(see Ramsay, 1977; MacShane, 1992), although not together in such a programme. Yet what 
is really claimed to distinguish partnership from both its elder relations (e.g.: the Mond-
Turner talks, productivity bargaining, industrial democracy, and worker-directors) as well as 
from its contemporary cousins such as ‘stakeholder’ models (see Hutton, 1995; Kay, 1997) 
and ‘mutual gains’ enterprises (Kochan & Osterman, 1994), and Pfeffer’s ‘best practice’ 
HRM (Pfeffer, 1994; 1998) is the attention paid to improving relationships, and in particular, 
to developing trust.  
 
From partnership advocates’ conceptualisations and participants’ accounts it is clear that 
neither the terms of a partnership agreement, nor especially its policies and structures, are as 
significant as these “internal behavioural transformations and attitudinal improvements” 
(Guest and Peccei, 1998: p2). In other words, there is something qualitatively different about 
how parties go about enacting partnership. For the IPA, this is “not so much about institutions 
or methods, as about attitudes and culture… building mutual trust, of recognising differences 
and finding common ground” (Coupar & Stevens, 1998: p145). IDS analysts note 
partnership’s “distinctive spirit… problem-solving and reaching decisions by consensus in an 
atmosphere of greater trust and openness” (1998: p2). Trust is its core idea.  
 
 
4. The development of trust through partnership. 
What is it about partnership, then, that might be expected to generate trust? The linkages 
between the two ideas, especially with Whitener and colleagues’ categories of trustworthy 
behaviour (op cit, above), are discussed below, and are set out in the Appendix.  
 
A common objective such as a publicly stated commitment to “the success of the enterprise” 
initiates the search for grounds for mutual trust - even if what constitutes “success” and “joint 
commitment” perhaps should be subject to a clarifying discussion among the partners. (This 
process may prove beneficial to all concerned.) Shared pursuit of a common goal encourages 
“behavioural consistency” and helps monitor “behavioural integrity”. But in itself this is 
rather cosmetic; it is the means through which success is sought that is more important.  
   
 
The commitment to “recognising the legitimate role of each partner” accepts pragmatically 
the potential for conflict, and thence mutual dependence and vulnerability. This sets clear 
boundaries around “behavioural consistency” and  “behavioural integrity”, and demonstrates, 
if not concern for the other’s interests, then at least awareness of, and respect for, them. 
Again, it is the means by which this commitment is translated into policy and practice that is 
more important.  
 
The commitment to “build trust” speaks for itself, of course, while “greater employee 
involvement” embodies Whitener et al’s “sharing and delegation of control”; indeed, the 
“extent to which managers involve employees” is a determining factor in the quality of trust 
(1998: p518). Employee involvement aids trust through helping employees render the factors 
affecting their working lives at least subject to some influence and allowing for some scope 
for protection of each party’s interests, reducing feelings of vulnerability. Greater input into 
decisions also reflects managerial confidence in employees, while refusal to countenance it on 
principle rather suggests the inverse.  
 
 
The principal means of doing so is through greater and more open information-sharing, and 
employee involvement in joint problem solving. Both practices provide the means for the 
initial exploration of a common agenda, and potentially the realisation of that agenda, which 
would be expected to generate trust. Sharing information also demonstrates a willingness to 
be trusted, and facilitates the crucial “intelligent appraisal of evidence” of each party’s 
trustworthiness. In the early stages, greater appreciation of the other party’s agenda helps 
promote shared understanding, and begins to diminish the fear and suspicions associated with 
the risk of engaging in deeper trust. It helps legitimise the reasons for change.  
 
If implemented to a sufficiently high quality at all levels, with all parties processing 
information in a trustworthy manner toward mutual benefits, joint problem solving cannot but 
enhance trust, and manage a successful partnership. Moreover, regular meetings over a 
mutually agreed agenda allow each party to familiarise themselves with each other(s), and 
each other’s motives and competence, further increasing trust levels. Joint problem-solving 
forums also act as a direct means of monitoring each party’s adherence to the common 
   
agenda, although it would of course be hypocritical, not to mention untrustworthy, to enter 
into a partnership, only to revert to non-collaborative tactics.  
 
If defined through the prism of trust, as here, it must bestow upon each party mutual capacity 
to influence the relationship’s decision-making, to resist unilateral imposition of diktat, and to 
punish abuse. Independent workforce representation - with sufficient resources, authority and 
legitimacy - is the only realistic, and constructive, means by which an organisational model 
that does true justice to the idea of ‘partnership’ can satisfy what Whitener’s team terms 
“sharing and delegation of control”.  
 
As suggested above, it is the manner in which this is conducted that is crucial. Partnership 
implies rather more than just ‘getting on well’. The implied negotiating strategies in a 
partnership resemble the “integrative bargaining” advocated by Walton and McKersie (1965), 
and the “tit-for-tat” approach from game theory: rewarding co-operation, and punishing 
‘defection’ (Axelrod, 1984). All of this links with each one of Whitener and colleagues’ 
trustworthy behaviours.  
 
In terms of organisational policy arising from the joint problem solving, partnership’s pursuit 
of balance between, on the one hand, employees’ desire for employment security and a share 
in success and a positive working environment and, on the other, employers’ pursuit of a 
skilled, committed and flexible staff would appear to offer a common agenda around which 
parties can build trust. A carefully drafted agreement balancing the two desires might be 
expected to generate trust by, firstly, inculcating a sense of a shared future, and indicating that 
the relationship is expected to last, encouraging the ‘leap of faith’ into a trust-based 
relationship. In particular, employment security provisions reduce the risk to the workforce 
(and their representatives) in agreeing to flexible work practices that might otherwise 
necessitate job losses or intensified workloads. As a ‘win’ it offsets (in part) the impact of 
these ‘losses’. Secondly, a negotiated exchange of acceptable concessions initiates feelings of 
reciprocity, from which trust may emerge. The quality of this exchange is a crucial test. The 
parallels with Whitener et al’s “demonstration of concern” are obvious.  
 
Finally, “sharing success” ties the workforce, and indeed the management team, to working 
toward ensuring the success as success is, self-evidently, in each party’s interest.  It also 
provides for mutual gain and the benevolent treatment that keeps the relationship positive. 
   
(Employment security, and a share of the spoils, also answers the “what’s-in-it-for-us?” cry 
from sceptical employees.) Here too are obvious parallels with Whitener et al’s 
“demonstration of concern”. So, if partnership seems to offer a potentially trust-enhancing 
agenda in theory, does it deliver in practice?  
 
 
5. Case studies: methodology.   
For my research I sought to examine the nature and experiences of participants from within 
identifiable, genuine ‘partnership’ organisations through qualitative case study research. 
Organisations were identified as able to demonstrate tangible evidence of a full and 
functioning partnership, as defined by the IPA and discussed above. The four organisations 
were: 
• Allied Distillers, a multi-site drinks manufacturer 
• Borg Warner Torq Transfers, a single-site engineering firm 
• Sportasia, a small non-unionised clothing firm  
• Wigan & Leigh NHS Health Services Trust.  
 
I considered that the most appropriate research focus should be the content of interpersonal 
behaviour and interactions. Salamon is surely correct when he notes that trust can only be 
established “between people [my emphasis] rather than between organisational collectivities 
called ‘management’ and ‘union’: inter-organisational trust stems from intra-organisational 
[and, I argue here, inter-personal] trust” (1998: p79).   
 
My principal data collection came from two or three sets of semi-structured one-to-one 
interviews with key players (i.e.: HR officers, union convenors and shop stewards where 
present, middle line managers and senior managers, including in each case the Managing 
Director or equivalent). In addition, I interviewed a small sample of non-key players from the 
‘shop floor’ (i.e.: machine operatives, administrative officers, nurses, cleaners). This is the 
first time ‘shop floor’ workers have been asked about partnership.  
 
The visits were conducted six to nine months apart to avoid a one-off ‘snap-shot’ of 
impressions, as well as to allow participants time for further reflection. The follow-up 
interviews tended to be with the key players. Additional material was sourced from company 
   
documents, conference presentations, and media reports. Open-ended questions were used to 
invite a discussion of, in the first instance, the narrative of the change process toward 
‘partnership’, seeking in particular to account for any attitudinal and behavioural shifts, and 
how these materialised.  
 
During the follow-up interviews I showed each interviewee short definitions of the five 
degrees of trust, and I asked them to reflect on which best described relations in the 
organisation at key stages of the progress toward partnership. Though not without 
methodological weaknesses – such as participants projecting their own experiences onto the 
organisation as a whole, and respondent bias - this proved highly illustrative.  
 
Space does not permit here even a summary of one of the case studies, let alone an overview 
of all four. What follows is at best a thumb-nail sketch of the main narrative events and 
noteworthy details from each.5  
 
 
6. Case study: Allied Distillers. 
Allied Distillers had always suffered from highly adversarial industrial relations with its 
recognised unions, the GMB, AEEU and MSF. But because any additional production costs 
could be passed on to a loyal consumer base through price rises, the situation was tolerated. 
Changes to production were ‘bought’, “anything to get the stuff out of the door” (respondent 
‘B’ below).  
 
The catalyst for their partnership initiative came in the mid-1990s when the parent company 
conducted a benchmarking exercise that revealed Allied Distillers to be among the least 
efficient producers, but easily the best paid, in the sector. A veiled threat to the future of the 
offending subsidiary sparked moves toward reform.  
 
The company brought in a new cadre of managers, coincidentally as the unions replaced many 
of their representatives. The partnership that was eventually agreed came at the fourth 
attempt, the previous efforts having been stymied by, variously, a reluctance among managers 
                                                          
5 The four studies have been published by the IPA in slightly ‘sanitised’ form (IPA: 2001a, b & c; IPA, 2002) in 
which, to help maintain cohesion among key personnel in the participating organisations, some animosities and 
concerns were downplayed, but not edited out. 
   
to share information about their plans, deep suspicions from one constituency of the 
workforce, and a series of incidents that revealed managerial inconsistency and dishonesty, 
despite publicly stated aspirations to the contrary.  
 
For the fourth attempt the management and union teams were ‘locked’ into a hotel for three 
weeks of negotiations. These succeeded primarily because managers shared confidential 
business information and their plans openly, and the talks secured significant ‘joint wins’ 
early on, demonstrating the viability of the partnership effort. Also, the intensity of the 
‘sealed’ venue spurred parties toward compromise and joint problem solving, to get the deal 
finalised. 
 
The agreement, called ‘Change Agenda’, was eventually approved in late 1996 after a costly 
and lengthy joint selling of its terms to a highly sceptical workforce. It comprised a guarantee 
of no redundancies for the deal’s three-year lifespan (beyond those job losses set out in the 
agreement), in exchange for workforce commitment to multi-skilling, training and the 
abolition of all demarcations. As part of a skills-linked salary review, everyone’s pay went up; 
there were “no losers” (respondent ‘D’). The agreement also inaugurated a number of new 
joint consultation forums. It was rewarded with huge capital investment from the parent 
company.   
 
The deal has since been ratified twice more, extending the employment security guarantee 
each time. But relations soured significantly in 2001. Inter-union animosities resurfaced, 
dismantling the ‘single-table’ process secured under partnership. More seriously, however, 
was a relatively minor incursion by management into employees’ privileges, which nearly 
brought about a complete collapse in the hard-won trust, almost taking the partnership down 
with it. Perhaps, viewed through the prism of trust, an organisation’s partnership is, to 
paraphrase the old football manager cliché, only as good as the last result? 
 
As can be seen from Table 1 below, relations pre-partnership were bleak (deterrence-based), 
but during the talks that produced ‘Change Agenda’, and the subsequent joint campaign to 
‘sell it’, trust levels soared to extraordinary levels (relational-based and even identification-
based) among the key players. Note however that the union respondents are markedly more 
cautious about reporting exalted trust levels than are their management partners. Each 
   
respondent conceded that trust levels were far higher between the key players than between 
the ‘workforce’ and the ‘company’. This remains an ongoing challenge. 
 
Table 1 – Allied Distillers respondents on trust continuum. 6 
 BEFORE 
PARTNERSHIP 
AT  
PARTNERSHIP 
2001. 
HR DIRECTOR ‘A’ - 4;  
0-2 
- 
HR MANAGER ‘B’ 0 3 to 4;  
2 
[2?] 
HR MANAGER ‘C’ - - 3;   
1 to 2 
SENIOR UNION REP ‘D’ - 3 3;  
0 
SENIOR UNION REP ‘E’ 0 1-2 1;  
0 
MANAGER ‘F’ [0] - 2 to 3;   
1 to 2 
 
 
7. Case study: BorgWarner Torq Transfers. 
BorgWarner is an auto components firms based in south Wales. In the 1970s it employed 
1,700 and, to all intents and purposes, the militant and well-organised engineering unions “ran 
the plant” (respondent ‘E’).  
 
The move toward partnership began in 1983 when a catastrophic downturn in what is a 
notoriously cyclical industry threatened to close the plant. Joint problem solving, reluctantly 
entered into but encouraged by increased information sharing about the business, produced a 
six-year pay deal that Bassett described in ‘Strike Free’ as “astonishing” (1986: pp98-99). It 
was not called a partnership, but that’s what it was. It demanded from those remaining 
“technical ability, flexibility and trust-based industrial relations” (then convenor). All rival 
firms were subsumed into one supra-ordinate enemy to foster unity, the Personnel manager 
commenting at the time: “We’re trying to get away from the concept of competition between 
                                                          
6 In each of the tables, the key is as follows: 
0 = deterrence-based trust; 1 = calculus-based trust; 2 = knowledge-based trust; 3 = relational-based trust; and 
4 = identification-based trust.  
The semi-colons (;) separate respondents’ comments on the nature of different relationships at work, with the 
respondent’s personal opinion and experience first, followed by any projected comment on relationships 
between ‘the workforce’ and ‘the organisation’.  
The dashes (-) indicate that the respondent did not offer comment on this period.  
The square brackets ([ ]) indicate that the respondent was not employed by the organisation during this period. 
   
management and employees, and replace it with competition between ourselves and our 
competitors” (quoted in Bassett, ibid).  
 
The flexible work practices that were patchily introduced improved performance, and staved 
off a further crisis until 1993. To save the plant this time job losses amounting to half the 
workforce were unavoidable, and some of them would have to be compulsory and would 
require the union (the AEEU) to abandon its ‘last-in-first-out’ principle. The enraged 
workforce only agreed to the deal once the union convinced them that they had seen the 
‘books’ and the plans, and that the management was not lying, and the reforms could work. In 
the end, the workforce accepted the deal four-to-one in favour. 
 
Shortly after this both sides committed to a process of joint problem solving to try to prevent 
such a catastrophe again, and to cement the benefits of the improved industrial relations. 
1997’s ‘Margam Way’ partnership agreement emerged from these talks. An ex-union official 
noted a switch in emphasis away from “prescriptive” substantive terms toward a more 
“conceptual” agreement, revolving around the notion of trust. One plant manager considered 
its overall philosophy as intended to concentrate minds more on “the way of discussing 
[workplace relations and issues], not the detail” (respondent ‘A’). Another (respondent ‘B’) 
felt it had  “built up the behavioural practices and the way this company thinks”.  
 
In fact the text is dominated with substantive detail, so these comments would seem to elevate 
the normative process of partnership above its more tangible outcomes. The deal confirmed a 
jointly designed and agreed, and scrupulously fair, redundancy policy (employment security 
being an unattainable promise), alongside commitments to flexible work practices.  
 
The union and management teams now meet almost daily, to discuss all matters pertaining to 
the running of the plant. All information is distributed openly: the union can even send the 
plant’s financial books to their own officials for scrutiny “to check we’re not having the wool 
pulled over our eyes” (respondent ‘E’). They have never felt the need. Team structures and 
continuous improvement techniques have improved production. All employees are rewarded 
with several gainsharing bonuses for hitting certain agreed performance targets. 
 
The deal has been amended each year ever since, although some on the ‘shop floor’ expressed 
frustration at what they perceive to be a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ choice.  
   
 
Table 2 – BorgWarner respondents on trust continuum. 7 
 BEFORE 
PARTNERSHIP 
AT  
PARTNERSHIP 
2001. 
PLANT MANAGER ‘A’   0 to 1 2 3;  
1 to 2 
PLANT MANAGER ‘B’ 0 to 1 [unspecified 
movement] 
3 
HR OFFICER ‘C’ - 3 2 to 1;  
0 
HR OFFICER ‘D’  1 to 2 3 to 4 
SENIOR UNION REP ‘E’ +  
SHOP STEWARD ‘F’ 
0 
 
2 3;   
1 to 2 
GROUP LEADER ‘G’ 1 2 2 
OPERATIVE ‘H’ [No reply] [No reply] [No reply] 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the firm began from a position of debilitating mistrust after 
1993’s crisis. Trust levels improved, albeit rather cautiously, during the design of the 
partnership in 1997, attributed in large part to the greatly increased information sharing and 
the siege mentality fostered from the two crises. Relations have stabilised [in 2001] into a 
comfortably high trust among all of the key players, although again the reps shy away from 
reporting very high trust levels. Shop steward ‘F’ argued that knowledge-based trust was 
“about the healthiest you can get… the ideal to aim for, because it doesn’t harm you to be 
wary”. The ‘shop floor’ is felt to be rather less trusting of managers, and of their union – this 
despite the very impressive information sharing which, intriguingly, is appreciated but still 
not believed! 
 
 
8. Case study: Sportasia. 
This defiantly non-unionised enterprise, based in Sheffield, designs, prints and produces 
school and corporate uniform and accessories. It began as an entrepreneurial venture among 
friends, and has grown to employ around 100 people. From its inception, the Managing 
Director sought to create a business that had as its core belief the primacy of what are called 
its ‘community values’. After consultation with the workforce, these were enshrined in a set 
of partnership-style rights and responsibilities to which all recruits are asked to sign up to in 
their employment contract.   
                                                          
7 The key is as before. (See previous footnote.) 
 
   
 
These establish joint problem solving and information sharing throughout the organisation, 
from each team and sub-department up to strategic level. There is guaranteed employment 
security after two years’ service, but in return every employee must commit to working 
effectively toward community goals. Reward is based on individual contribution (perhaps a 
curious feature of a ‘community’), and there are profit-related bonuses and an employee share 
ownership scheme.  
 
There is no perceived role whatsoever for a union, although the MD insists that if the 
‘community’ asked for one, he would have no problem with that. In fact, if anything, the 
‘community’ model is such that the interests of the employer (efficiencies, productivity 
improvements, profitability) are rather downplayed.  
 
This example belies the assumption that partnership is not possible in non-unionised settings, 
although some may balk at the rigour with which the community values are ‘indoctrinated’ 
(through educational training) and ‘enforced’ (through coaching, or disciplinary procedures 
where appropriate).  
 
Table 3 – Sportasia respondents on trust continuum. 8 
 BEFORE 
PARTNERSHIP 
AT  
PARTNERSHIP 
2001 
FOUNDER/ MANAGING 
DIRECTOR ‘A’ 
- - 2 to 3 
DIRECTOR ‘B’ - - 3 
DIRECTOR ‘C’ - - 3 to 4 
SUPERVISER ‘D’ - - 4; 
2 to 3 
TEAM LEADER ‘E’ - - 3 to 4 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, what is striking about the Sportasia ‘story’ is that since 1988 
little of note has happened! The narrative is one of unbroken steady progress and 
achievement, with no crises. When one challenge to the community’s shared values - a failed 
business venture in 2000 - hit everyone’s pay packets and bonuses it did not cause any 
significant problems, and was barely commented upon in respondents’ testimonies. All 
respondents reported very high trust levels throughout the firm, although anecdotal evidence 
                                                          
8 The key is as before. (See previous footnote.) 
   
from interviews with ‘shop floor’ employees did uncover, alongside sincere appreciation of 
the firm as a good place to work, mild dissenting grumbles about one or two of the 
community’s more onerous strictures.  
 
A challenge will present itself should the firm exceed a manageable headcount level. 
However, the stability of personnel and the robustness of the firm’s constitution and systems 
suggest that Sportasia should be capable of retaining its unique culture during any future 
expansions. 
 
 
9. Case study: Wigan & Leigh NHS Health Services Trust. 
Wigan & Leigh NHS Health Services Trust, as it then was, recognises eighteen different trade 
unions, of which three predominate: UNISON, MSF and the GMB. (The RCN declined to 
take part in this research.) 
 
The catalyst for moves to address the organisation’s antagonistic (but not especially 
aggressive) industrial relations came in 1997 with the realisation that neither the Trust’s 
modus operandi – ‘bulldozing’ policy past the unions with only token gestures at consultation 
– nor the unions’ defensive stalling and spoiling tactics matched the new government’s 
exhortations for managers and unions to work in partnership. The unions were deeply 
suspicious, but reasoned that if partnership could deliver tangible benefits to their members it 
should be supported; if not, they could revert to adversarialism with a clear conscience.  
 
The Partnership Forum operated in parallel with the Whitley-ist joint committees. A 
succession of impressive joint problem solving initiatives produced significant ‘joint wins’, 
including the shared research and authorship of around 20 organisational HR policies. These 
helped to demonstrate to cynics on all sides the merits of partnership. A joint ‘meet-the-
workforce’ walkabout event to solicit staff suggestions on ways to improve the organisation 
was hailed as “the best thing we’ve ever done” (‘D’).   
 
Several months into the process, in 1999, the joint working party wrote a joint statement of 
[partnership] intent. The text was confined primarily to well-intentioned aspirations rather 
than firm policy commitments, and so while it cemented the joint effort further, the wider 
workforce met it with indifference.  
   
 
When a number of leading architects of the burgeoning partnership left the Trust, new leaders 
reiterated support for partnership, but signalled a change in approach. Decision-making was 
gradually withdrawn from the protracted joint design process and replaced with management-
penned proposals tabled for discussion. In doing so, HR highlighted a perceived conflict 
between the unions’ need to ensure their own internal democracy [i.e.: consulting their 
members continually and adequately] and administrative effectiveness: “You have to 
continually pose the question, ‘what is the purpose for using partnership?’ Is it for employee 
involvement and ‘inclusivity’, or for better policy outcomes?” ( respondent ‘A’). Some union 
reps responded in kind, using scepticism and adversarialism in the infrequent joint meetings. 
Others continued to try to work with the new approach. 
 
A revised partnership agreement was nodded through in 2001, with few union objections. It 
sets out a potentially very impressive model of devolved joint problem solving, and in the 
words of the text, “joint decision-making wherever possible”, at all levels of the Trust. The 
vision is for workplace-level joint forums to feed into sectional forums and up to the strategic 
level, and for the higher-level forums to issue guidance and direction to the lower-level 
forums. When the research finished this had yet to be implemented.  
 
Table 4 – ‘Wigan & Leigh NHS Trust’ respondents on trust continuum. 9 
 BEFORE 
PARTNERSHIP 
AT 
PARTNERSHIP 
2001 
SENIOR HR MANAGER ‘A’ - - 2 to 4;  
0 to 4 
SENIOR HR MANAGER ‘B’ 0 1 to 3 1 to 2 
UNION REP ‘C’ 2 - 1 to 2 
UNION REP ‘D’ 0 2 3 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, it is apparent that the process of engaging in ‘partnership’ has 
improved trust levels, but for the most part levels are relatively low, and consensus over trust 
levels is less clear-cut. Indicative of this is that many reflections are pitched around the 
threshold of positive trust (1-2).  Perceptions are more subject to the individual enthusiasms of 
the key players and, as ‘A’ conceded, highly dependent on both the issue involved. This 
would seem to reflect the half-implemented and patchy status of the partnership, and the 
                                                          
9 The key is as before. (See previous footnote.) 
 
   
contradictory tactics deployed by both the management team and some of the union 
representatives. The Wigan and Leigh ‘partnership’ is, however, still in development – as, 
indeed, are the arrangements in each of the other case studies.  
 
 
10. Findings: general themes. 
I confine myself here only to discussion of the reported linkages between partnership and trust 
rather than the myriad of other fascinating issues surrounding these two concepts. The 
findings are of course constrained by the familiar limitations of qualitative research methods 
(although each organisation approved my narrative account of their ‘partnership’), and what 
follows are my inferences from participants’ accounts, rather than ‘facts’ as such. However, 
the findings do generate an abundance of intriguing generalisable learning outcomes, debating 
points and testable hypotheses for future research.  
 
The need for behavioural consistency and integrity is the central lesson of all of the case 
studies. Where consistency and integrity was applied and even enforced under partnership, 
trust matured into strong forms (particularly relational-based trust). Where behaviour was 
inconsistent or contrary, both the partnership and trust faltered (calculus-based or, at best, a 
wary knowledge-based trust).  
 
The bulk of respondents’ self-reports accounting for shifts in degrees of trust tallied 
consistently with the overall narrative of the partnership. In all four case studies the 
‘partnership’ transformed the atmosphere, or spirit, of employment relations. At the non-
unionised firm their partnership-style programme had already generated very high trust levels 
prior to its being enshrined in a formal statement of intent. In each of the unionised studies 
key players’ reflections overwhelmingly, though not unanimously, pointed to transparently 
major improvements in the quality of trust, often starting from a state of complete mistrust 
(deterrence-based trust), following the partnership agreement. As the partnership became 
embedded, and demonstrated its value to the key players, so the trust strengthened (up to, and 
including, remarkably, reports of identification-based trust between managers and union 
representatives who previously had been locked in bitter, aggressive conflict). However, 
where partnership was not so convincingly embedded, trust remained fickle, disparate and 
lacked cohesion among all the participants.  
 
   
It should be noted that these respondents are not gullible or weak-willed persons. Most had 
had many years’ experience of British-style adversarialism and mutual mistrust, and indeed 
had revelled in the pre-partnership codes of behaviour. Moreover, the union officials, in 
engaging with partnership, rendered themselves susceptible to their members’ fury, and did 
not do so on a whim, or to follow ‘fashionable’ trends in modern management.  
 
A major finding is that this enhanced trust seems confined in the main to the senior key 
players in the management and trade union/ workforce teams. Almost all of these respondents 
felt that partnership had had a powerful positive impact on their working lives, and had 
established very strong trust-based friendships, indeed. This is not, however, replicated to 
anything like the same extent in relationships between the organisation/ management and 
'shop floor'/ ordinary employees in general. This was found to be the case not only in the three 
unionised enterprises (was it not ever thus?) but, fascinatingly, also within the non-unionised 
firm. Even within partnership organisations, and even those with long-standing arrangements, 
a residual if passive wariness of ‘management’, bordering on mistrust, prevailed among much 
of the workforce. (At one of the unionised firms, each workforce ballot endorsing the 
partnership returned the same result three times over six years: a 75-25 split in favour.)  
 
This discrepancy in trust levels can be readily explained by the trust literature. Firstly, the 
individuals most immediately involved in partnership engage with each other much more 
frequently, as equals, on commonly agreed agendas, seeking mutually beneficial outcomes, in 
often emotionally-charged meetings. This process must, if conducted in a consistent manner, 
inevitably improve trust levels among these individuals. But as HR Director ‘A’ in Allied 
Distillers noted, most ‘shop floor’ employees do not see managers (or their union reps) on a 
regular basis in a variety of situations, and nor are they typically able to exert much influence 
on partnership’s strategic decision-making, and so – as the trust literature would infer – these 
employees are more likely to feel vulnerable and uncertain, and less confident in bestowing 
trust.  
 
From this one might hypothesise that, where managers meet more frequently with the 
workforce, and/or devolve joint problem solving down to the lowest levels, and/or share 
information openly and explain the reasons for organisational decisions, trust levels among 
the non-key players might be expected to increase. (That said, the experience at BorgWarner 
suggests that not even this can be assumed.) Managers and trade unions should certainly not 
   
neglect to communicate with, and involve the wider workforce. Efforts to instil trust within 
the workforce as a whole are essential, lest a ‘partnership elite’ be seen as remote and self-
serving. 
 
Given that the trust seems predominantly confined to, and heavily dependent on, certain key 
players, it follows that for trust to endure and develop the original partnership signatories, or 
like-minded persons, must stay the course. In the studies, where there was disruption to the 
personnel among the key players trust suffered setbacks; where continuity had prevailed trust 
levels were higher. A supplementary point is that partnership also relies on the benign support 
of the organisation’s senior managers; even enthusiastic key players can do little to save a 
‘marginalised’, token-gesture partnership initiative. 
 
As Guest and Peccei found (1998; 2001), agreeing and enacting a clear and inviolable set of 
partnership principles was shown to underpin the design and implementation of partnership 
practices. Evidence from the case studies appear to support this: where commitment to the 
principles was susceptible to equivocation the practices were less widespread and less 
coherent, tensions and conflicts were more prevalent, progress less impressive, and the trust 
less developed. The important point here is that the key players have to believe in the other’s 
convictions, and the convictions must bear tangible benefits for all, regularly. Warm words 
endorsing the partnership principles are clearly not sufficient. Incidents of contrary 
behaviours from one party prompted a re-appraisal of participation in partnership from the 
aggrieved ‘victim’. Also, respondents’ carefully suspended judgements on their organisation’s 
trust levels suggest that trust is not naïve, or ‘false consciousness’, and that it is based on an 
intelligent appraisal of evidence – and this appraisal is ongoing. Trust is essentially dynamic 
and ever-fluctuating, and it needs to be constantly demonstrated and reinvigorated. 
 
The studies viewed as a piece suggest that the strength or otherwise of partnership lies not in 
the content and structures, since each of the four case studies here have very different 
arrangements, but in the attitudes and behaviours of the key players. An agreement, or 
statement of intent, must be in place - and where it was not, progress was stalled - and the 
structures and practices must be used effectively. But, to return to Becker, Hueslid and Ulrich 
(op cit), it is in how the “strategy” is “executed”. The organisation with potentially exemplary 
practices had yet to develop the requisite attitudes and behaviours, while the firm with – on 
   
paper - the least impressive practices enjoyed key players demonstrating abundantly high trust 
levels.  
 
The above comment notwithstanding, the following features of partnership were cited as 
decisive influences on the development of enhanced trust. Firstly, joint acknowledgement of 
common objectives spurred efforts to find common ground, and reduced sources of animosity 
and conflict.  Secondly, the increased frequency of interactions among the key players across 
a range of workplace issues reduced the potency of assumed antagonisms, and increased 
players’ estimation of the other’s trustworthiness (and shared humanity!) In tandem, increased 
dissemination of honest organisational information had a particularly marked influence on 
behaviours, demonstrating a willingness to trust while manoeveuring parties’ strategic 
responses toward co-operation, and inviting joint problem solving. Fourthly, securing tangible 
benefits, and demonstrations of mutual gain, helped reinforce the value of the partnership/ 
trust-building, especially early on. Provisions for employment security were viewed very 
positively, since it allowed all parties (but especially the employees) to feel confident about 
the future, and reduced the gnawing doubt in union reps’ heads that they were about to be 
duped. Intriguingly, sharing success was not mentioned at all as a positive and helpful 
outcome.  
 
 
11. Concluding remarks. 
Partnership relies on trust, but trust is a commodity in perpetual flux. Its shifting quality 
according to circumstances allows for the possibility of both weak and strong forms (cf. 
Barney & Hansen, 1994), positive and negative experiences, mutual success and unilateral 
betrayal. This lesson, and the evidence from the case studies, should dissuade any 
commentator (cynic and evangelist alike) from inferring that partnership constitutes an ideal-
type, permanent resolution of the “structured antagonism” inherent in the employment 
relationship (cf. Edwards, 1986). Plainly, it is nothing of the sort, and nor should any serious 
commentator have imagined that it could have been.   
 
Is the pursuit of mutual trust at work a shrewd HRM strategy objective? It enjoys an 
uncommonly good press. Arrow (1974) for instance considers it “the most efficient 
governance mechanism” available, as does Sabel (1997). Barney and Hansen argued that all 
forms, even the “weak” variants but especially the “strong” forms, offered firms a potentially 
   
decisive competitive advantage (Barney & Hansen, 1994). Beyond concerns over parties 
rendering themselves vulnerable to exploitation – which the definition presented here largely 
offsets – and the pitfalls of complacency and complicity, it is difficult to find many sensible 
objections to the spread of trust at work.  
 
However, it does entail considerable risk for participants, from inception and beyond. As trust 
is deepened and strengthened its benefits increase, but so too does the terrible prospect of 
betrayal. This increases pressure on all parties to adhere to trust’s strictures, but at the same 
time constrains otherwise fruitful options, including opportunism. The dilemma (familiar to 
game theorists) is, firstly, that the fall-out from error or abuse of trust is likely to be worse 
than if one had not attempted to improve trust relations at all, and that, secondly, resisting 
opportunism might not always be in parties’ best interests.  
 
The management of trust is fraught with challenges: just as over-reliance on deterrence fuels 
suspicion and thus debilitates “weak” forms of trust (what Wicks, Berman and Jones call 
“under-investment” in trust - 1999: p101), so can “stronger” forms’ lead to more relaxed 
performance monitoring and tolerance that can invite exploitation from the unscrupulous.  
 
That said, from the testimonies of all the respondents here, the gains to be had are 
considerable, and positive mutual trust as a way of conducting relationships is much preferred 
to adversarial conflict.  
 
With these caveats in mind it would seem prudent to recommend that advocates of partnership 
resist overly ambitious claims for what partnership can deliver. A modest, achievable and 
certainly valuable outcome from any partnership programme would be the sustainable 
establishment of positive, efficient knowledge-based trust, and in more sophisticated and 
long-standing forms, relational-based trust.  
 
If, as suggested in these case studies, it is information sharing and joint problem solving that 
really improves trust, then this perhaps offers the basis for a strong argument in favour of 
greater institutional support for partnership. The forthcoming EC directive on information and 
consultation needs to be given more support by the British government. (UK employers’ bitter 
resistance may in part stem from a desire to retain their managerial prerogative, but from the 
analysis here, demonstrates starkly their lack of trust in their employees.) Additionally, 
   
legislation strengthening information sharing and consultative obligations in the event of mass 
redundancies, to at least jointly manage this ‘defection’, would also be welcome. 
 
Obviously, our understanding would benefit from researchers testing these claims in other 
partnership settings, using different research methods, particularly surveys. For example, this 
research was conducted in recognisable ‘partnership’ organisations. Comparative research 
might investigate whether trust levels are qualitatively worse in non-partnership organisations. 
A danger, however, is that one-off ‘snap-shots’ recording trust levels at a given time may only 
reflect events and impressions from the immediate past; shifts in degrees of trust would need 
to be tracked over time to avoid this distortion.  
 
Is it the case that trust levels are greatly enhanced among the key ‘partnership’ players, but are 
not carried into the workforce as a whole? Why might this be the case?  Thirdly, which of the 
partnership elements are most decisive in improving trust levels: the greater information 
sharing, the regular joint problem solving, the employment security? Or are they incidental to, 
simply, consistent benevolent behaviour? Are any of these essential, or will trust emerge 
solely from consistent attitudes and behaviours in interpersonal interactions?  
 
Finally, sector-level survey research among similar firms, differentiated only by the presence 
or otherwise of a genuine ‘partnership’ agreement, can begin to answer whether partnership 
delivers improved organisational performance. 
 
This article has outlined precise definitions of both trust in the workplace and the 
‘partnership’ form of managing workplace relationships. It has indicated the potentially 
fruitful linkages between the two concepts, at least according to the theory, and presented 
qualitative case study evidence from four genuine partnership organisations that provide some 
support for the much-vaunted links between partnership and trust, but also highlighted several 
problematic areas and obstacles in the process of developing partnership based on trust.  
 
Graham Dietz, ERIM Research Fellow.  
Department of Organisatie, 
Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam. 
 
29 September 2002. 
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Appendix: The links between trust and partnership. 
 
 
Trust 
element 
IPA partnership element HR  practice(s) 
An ongoing 
relationship. 
- Joint commitment to success 
- Workforce representation. 
- A statement to this effect. 
- All-level joint problem solving processes. 
A reciprocal 
relationship for 
mutual gains. 
- Recognising each party’s legitimate roles 
and interests/ workforce representation. 
 
- Employment security/ flexibility. 
 
 
 
 
- Sharing success. 
- A statement to this effect. 
- All-level joint problem solving processes. 
 
- No-compulsory redundancies/ retraining and 
redeployment; fair & joint redundancy management. 
- More efficient and flexible working.  
- Improved job design, quality (and output) 
 
- Pay deal linked to organisational performance, 
profit-sharing, employee share ownership, 
gainsharing… 
The future is 
uncertain; it 
involves risk for 
all parties. 
- Joint commitment to success.  
- Workforce representation. 
 
- Employment security/ flexibility. 
 
- Information sharing. 
 
- Sharing success. 
- All-level joint problem solving processes. 
 
 
- See above. 
 
- ‘Open books’,  sharing confidential information. 
 
- See above. 
All parties have 
the capacity to 
inflict damage on 
the other. 
- Recognising each party’s legitimate roles 
and interests/ workforce representation. 
 
- [Options to ‘defect’.] 
 
 
 
- [Excludes ‘no-strike’ deals?] 
The relationship is 
a freely-agreed 
arrangement. 
 - Absence of threats (beyond evident, jointly 
recognised, operational realities). 
 
- [Workforce endorsement of the deal?] 
Based on an 
intelligent 
appraisal of 
evidence. 
- Information sharing. - See above. Also training in basic finance and 
business context (if required). 
The appraisal of 
the evidence is 
subjective and 
aggregated. 
- [Expected to emerge through the 
“building trust” process.] 
- Regular interactions (in joint problem solving, but 
also high visibility from both management and 
employee reps). 
Each is disposed 
positively toward 
the other(s). 
- [Expected to emerge through the 
“building trust” process.] 
- Achieving ‘quick wins’. Also behavioural training  
(if required). 
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